

Approved For Release 2001/08/14 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003000010001
before Senate Appropriations' Defense Subcommittee, 14 Mar 79
Subject: Iran/Korea/Vietnam

Transition - activist

Recognition limits

Not to say withdrawing

Can not

Re-emergence from post-VN

aversion to intervention

More judicious - choices not easy

Whom to support

Ogaden

Cambodia

Not monolithic communism

And not irreversible

Indo Sudan Egypt

If do decide intervene - recognize

hazards

1. Visibility

International comms

2. Pol pressure resisted

3. Mil dynamic against

Means anticipate - not react

Long term influence

Understand underlying factors

Broader collection

Different analyses

YEMEN

Ismail - N Yemeni

Radical Marxist

NDF

Religious split

Saudi role

Less pop than Yemen

June - assassination N. Yemen leader

Salih - unknown - weak mil man

Week before last - rebels in position where might cut comm to

S. N. Yemen

Arab force ?

Iraq, Syria disturbed

Overall concern Sov infl in area

Saudis, too

Little mil action last few days

No hard data Sov/Cuban/Eth involvement

Sov - certainly supplied equipment

Sov/Cuban - Training

Cuban - involvement ?

Negotiations quite possible

Salih step down

Possibly Iraqi backed

Baathists or other non-communist leftists

25X1

Saudi turf

Appeared ineffective

Mil

Dipl

Iraqi gain

25X1D

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AFGHAN

Continual fighting in country

Taraki - control cities

Ruthless - purges

Coup attempt yesterday -

Dissident communist branch

Pak based Muslim dissidents

Holy war - ?

IRAN

Immediate danger

Polarization -

Secular - Bazargan leaders

Religious extremists

Khomeini move to Qom has placed him more under infl of extremists

Khomeini no pol/econ plan or capability

Up to Bazargan - 3 challenges

1. Success - oil workers

2.5 bbl/da

2. ? Dissolving Revolutionary Councils

Uncertain

3. Organize some viable army

Collapse SAVAK

Collapse Army

Left vulnerable

a. To tribal and ethnic divisiveness

b. To left

Ample leftist forces

5 + groups

Lots arms

Organization

Danger -

Secular elements, e.g., women, anti-Islamic law, referendum, education policy, etc. will turn to left as only recourse

Soviet Role

Minimal in fall of Shah

trying to capitalize

Two track policy

relations with regime

avoid provoking West; but

support for opposition--Tudeh

no hurry to see current chaotic situation ended

Critical of US role

Intensified propaganda

Indirect support for training of Iranians

Palestinians

Libyans

South Yemenis

Regional CPs

Moscow - 1 April

CHINA - VN

Xmas only small Chinese border forces

14 Feb buildup 8 armies -

Warning memo

17 Feb attack

5 Mar withdrawal

400,000 men and 2 armies in reserve

600-700 aircraft

Thin, small unit attack, 1300 km

25-50 km penetrations

Appears balance

"Punish" - Show China not permit VN intrude Camb -

Show Sov Treaty Nov not helpful

Not force Sov reaction

Deng appears be winning

Domestically - claim victory

Internationally

VN withdrawing forces Camb - 30,000

Sov not react other than logistics

Significant defeat at Lang Son

Long run ?

Greater Sov role

Perception of PRC

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Kampucheans continue stiff resistance

Throughout the country - SW

VN re-supply effort hampered

Quick VN thrust took major towns

Kampuchean forces

Pol Pot - Battambang

16 of 31 VN combat divisions tied down

Hanoi now withdrawing equipment

artillery

anti-tank weapons

Kampuchean forces regrouping - division-size combat units

Chinese getting supplies to Kampucheans via Thailand

Rainy season - July-Aug

Pol Pot regime resented by Kampuchean people

No change in Pol Pot

Sihanouk in Peking

Chinese may use him

Sihanouk refusing to work with Pol Pot

(1A

I - 4 Jan

II 23 Feb (2 Feb)

Orderly - believe protected sensitive equipment

Three uses:

ICBM TM

ABM treaty monitoring

ABM R&D

Alternatives - TM

Back into Iran

Other locations

Aircraft

Satellites

Better analysis

Each tech/pol risks

Short term unlikely do as well

6X1A

NY TIMES story on SS-18

(1D

TM not in hand until 27 Feb

SALT not limit to 10

Not greater than set date

Sov Fall back on simulated ?

KOREA

Army findings Spring '78

DIA/CIA Tasking

Still differences

32 - 37 - 41

Difficult

Concentration on warning

Units dispersed

Added ones back

Chart

Chart Equipment increases tipped off

Not sudden - 8 years

NK posit better than estimated 18 mo. ago

Talks -

PRC - US Normalization

80 NK Pilots - Libya

Sov reopening?